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We propose a model of history dependent disappointment aversion (HDDA), allowing the
attitude of a decision-maker (DM) towards disappointment at each stage of a T-stage lottery to
evolve as a function of his history of disappointments and elations in prior stages. We establish
an equivalence between the existence of an HDDA representation and two documented cogni-
tive biases. First, the DM overreacts to news: after suffering a disappointment, the DM lowers
his threshold for elation and becomes more risk averse; similarly, after an elating outcome, the
DM raises his threshold for elation and becomes less risk averse. This makes disappointment
more likely after elation and vice-versa, leading to statistically cycling risk attitudes. Second,
the DM displays a primacy effect: early outcomes have the strongest effect on risk attitude.
“Gray areas” in the elation-disappointment assignment are connected to optimism and pes-
simism in determining endogenous reference points.
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1. Introduction
Consider two people in a casino who have the same total wealth and the same utility for monetary
prizes. One person has already won several games at the roulette wheel; the other person lost at
thosegames. Willthese individuals’ attitudes towardfurtherriskbethesame, ormighttheydepend
on whether they had previously won or lost? Consider now a third person who has just won $100 in
a lottery between $100 and $x. Even though his winnings are $100 in both cases, could his attitude
to future risk depend on whether x, the alternate outcome, corresponded to winning or losing a
thousand dollars?
There is experimental evidence that the way in which risk unfolds over time affects risk atti-
tudes(e.g., ThalerandJohnson(1990), GneezyandPotters(1997), Bellemare, Krause, Kr¨ oger, and
Zhang(2005), andPost, vandenAssem, Baltussen, andThaler(2008)); andmoreover, thatindivid-
uals are affected by unrealized outcomes, a phenomenon known as counterfactual thinking (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Kahneman and Miller (1986), and Medvec, Madey and Gilovich
(1995)). ThalerandJohnson(1990)suggestthatindividualsbecomemoreriskaverseafternegative
experiences and less risk averse after positive ones. Post, van den Assem, Baltussen, and Thaler
(2008) suggest that individuals are more willing to take risks after extreme realizations. The latter
two studies consider settings of pure chance—suggesting that the effects therein are psychologi-
cal in origin, and are not the result of learning about oneself or one’s environment. However, a
psychological effect on risk attitude may potentially exist in more general contexts; for example,
among NBA basketball players, Rao (2009) shows that “a majority of the players...signiﬁcantly
change their behavior in response to hit streaks by taking more difﬁcult shots” but that “controlling
for shot conditions, players show no evidence of ability changing as a function of past outcomes.”
In this paper, we propose a model of history-dependent disappointment aversion (HDDA) over
T-stage lotteries that permits risk attitudes to be shaped by prior experiences. Our building block is
Gul (1991)’s model of disappointment aversion for one-stage lotteries, in which a decision maker
(DM) categorizes monetary outcomes of a lottery as elating or disappointing, and calculates his
“expected utility” of a lottery while uniformly overweighting the disappointing outcomes. A prize
is elating (disappointing) if its utility is weakly larger than (strictly smaller than) the utility of the
lottery as a whole. For a ﬁxed utility over monetary prizes, the DM’s risk aversion is increasing
in his disappointment aversion coefﬁcient (the additional weight he places on disappointing out-
comes). We extend Gul’s idea to a multi-stage setting with history dependence, analyzing how
1disappointments and elations affect the evolution of risk attitude (by way of the disappointment
aversion coefﬁcient).
To ease exposition, we begin by describing our HDDA model in the simple setting of temporal
lotteries, in which no intermediate choices may be taken while risk unfolds; later, the model is
extended in a dynamically consistent manner to the setting of stochastic decision trees, with our
results carrying over. In the HDDA model, the DM endogenously characterizes each realization of
a temporal lottery (itself a sublottery) as elating or disappointing. At each stage, the DM’s history
is the preceding sequence of elations and disappointments. Each possible history corresponds
to a (potentially different) disappointment aversion coefﬁcient. The HDDA model consists of a
continuous and increasing utility function over monetary prizes, a set of potential disappointment
aversion coefﬁcients, and a history assignment mapping sublotteries to those coefﬁcients. The
value of a lottery is determined recursively using the model of disappointment aversion and the
appropriate disappointment aversion coefﬁcient for each history, with the requirement that the
history assignment for all sublotteries be internally consistent. Internally consistency requires that
if a sublottery is considered elating (disappointing), then its value should indeed be weakly larger
than (strictly smaller than) the value of the sublottery from which it emanates.
We do not place an explicit restriction on how histories map to disappointment aversion co-
efﬁcients (that is, how risk aversion should depend on the history). Nonetheless, we show that
the HDDA model predicts two well-documented cognitive biases; and that these biases are sufﬁ-
cient conditions for an HDDA representation to exist. First, in accordance with the experimental
evidence cited above, the DM overreacts to news: he becomes less risk averse after positive ex-
periences and more risk averse after negative ones. Second, the DM displays primacy effects: his
risk attitudes are disproportionately affected by early realizations. Sequencing biases, especially
the primacy effect, are robust and long-standing experimental phenomena (early literature includes
Anderson (1965)). The primacy effect has implications for the optimal sequencing of information
to manipulate behavior; for example, we study how a ﬁnancial advisor trying to convince a DM to
invest in a risky asset should deliver mixed news.
HDDA also has predictions for the DM’s endogenous reference levels. In particular, the model
predicts disappointment cycles. The DM increases the threshold for elation after positive expe-
riences and lowers it after negative experiences. This makes disappointment more likely after
elation, and vice-versa, leading to statistically cycling risk attitudes. The psychological literature,
in particular Parducci (1995) and Smith, Diener, and Wedell (1989), provides support for the pre-
diction that elation thresholds increase (decrease) after positive (negative) experiences.1
1Summarizingtheseworks, SchwarzandStrack(1998)observethat“anextremenegative(positive)eventincreased
2For some lotteries, there may be more than one internally consistent assignment of histories.
The DM’s history assignment is revealed by preferences. Because the DM’s choice of assignment
may affect his utility from a temporal lottery, we view an optimist as a DM who always chooses the
“most favorable” interpretation (when more than one interpretation is possible) and a pessimist as
a DM who always chooses the “least favorable” interpretation. This notion of optimism and pes-
simism is distinct from previous notions which identify optimism and pessimism with the choice
of (distorted) beliefs; for example, see B´ enabou and Tirole (2002), Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and
Grant (2007), or Epstein and Kopylov (2007).
Applied work suggests that changing risk aversion helps to understand several empirical phe-
nomena. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) allow risk aversion to depend on prior stock market
gains and losses ` a la the experimental evidence of Thaler and Johnson (1990), and show that their
model is consistent with the well-documented equity premium and excess volatility puzzles. Rout-
ledge and Zin (2010) address the same empirical phenomena, proposing a generalization of Gul’s
model for one-stage lotteries that allows for a subset of lotteries to be valued under expected utility
theory. Applying their model recursively (and without history dependence), they show that the
preference parameters and transition probabilities between low and high states of the economy can
be calibrated to generate effective risk aversion that is countercyclical.
In the HDDA model, risk attitudes are affected by “what might have been.” In many theories
of choice over temporal lotteries, risk aversion could depend on the passage of time, wealth ef-
fects or habit formation in consumption; see Kreps and Porteus (1978), Chew and Epstein (1989),
Segal (1990), Dillenberger (2010), and Rozen (2010), among others. We study how risk attitudes
are affected by the past, independently of such effects as above. Our type of history dependence
is conceptually distinct from models where contemporaneous and future beliefs affect contempo-
raneous utility (that is, dependence of utility on “what might be” in the future). This literature
includes Caplin and Leahy (2001), Epstein (2008), and K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2009).2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the domain of tempo-
ral lotteries. Section 3 provides a primer on the model of disappointment aversion of Gul (1991).
Section 4 formalizes the HDDA model and contains our main results for temporal lotteries. Im-
(decreased) satisfaction with subsequent modest events....Thus, the occasional experience of extreme negative events
facilitates the enjoyment of the modest events that make up the bulk of our lives, whereas the occasional experience of
extreme positive events reduces this enjoyment.”
2In K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2009), given any ﬁxed current belief over consumption, utility is not affected by prior
history (how that belief was formed). Their model, which presumes the DM is loss averse over changes in successive
beliefs, could be generalized to include historical differences in beliefs, which would then affect utility values but
not actual risk aversion due to their assumption of additive separability; we conjecture that one could relax additive
separability to ﬁnd choices of parameters and functional forms for their model that replicate the primacy effect and
overreaction to news predicted by HDDA.
3plications of HDDA are studied in Section 5. Section 6 extends our model and results to a setting
where intermediate actions are possible. Axiomatic foundations for HDDA are provided in Section
7. Section 8 discusses directions for further research.
2. Framework: T-stage lotteries
We begin by studying the simple setting of T-stage lotteries; in Section 6 we extend the setting to
stochastic decision trees.
Let X =[w;b]R be a bounded interval of monetary prizes, where w is the worst prize and b is
the best prize. The set of all simple lotteries (i.e., having a ﬁnite number of outcomes) over X is de-
noted L(X), or simply L 1. Elements of L 1 are one-stage lotteries. We reserve lowercase letters
for one-stage lotteries; typical elements of L 1 are denoted p, q, or r. The probability of a monetary
outcome x under p is denoted p(x). A typical element p has the form hp(x1);x1;:::;p(xm);xmi.
The degenerate lottery dx 2 L 1 gives the prize x with probability one.
Two-stage lotteries are simple lotteries over L 1. The set of two-stage lotteries is denoted
L (L (X)), or simply L 2. A typical element P 2 L 2 has the form
P = ha1;p1;:::;am;pmi;
where for every j, pj 2 L 1, and a j 2 [0;1], with å
m
j=1a j = 1.














j 2 L T 1 is a (T  1)-stage lottery. If PT 1
j is the outcome of PT, then all
remaining uncertainty is resolved according to PT 1
j . To simplify notation, we use the superscript
T only when T  3. The degenerate lottery d
T
x 2 L T gives the lottery d
T 1
x with probability one
(i.e., x is received with probability one after T stages).
To avoid redundancy, our notation for any t-stage lottery implicitly assumes that the elements
in the support are distinct.
43. Disappointment aversion
The model of disappointment aversion proposed by Gul (1991) characterizes a DM’s preferences
over the set of one-stage lotteries, L 1. For any lottery p 2 L 1, consider its certainty equivalent
CE(p). This is the monetary prize which the DM considers to be indifferent to p itself. The lot-
tery p may contain prizes in its support which are weakly preferred to p; receiving such a prize
is considered an elating outcome. The lottery p may also contain prizes in its support which are
worse than p; receiving such a prize is a disappointing outcome. Gul’s model of disappointment
aversion considers a DM who values lotteries by taking their “expected utility,” except that disap-
pointing outcomes get a uniformly greater weight that depends on the value of a single parameter
b, the coefﬁcient of disappointment aversion. SinceCE(p) depends on all the prizes in the support
of p, the division into elating and disappointing outcomes (known as the elation-disappointment
decomposition), is determined endogenously, as seen in the utility representation below.
Formally, the disappointment aversion model consists of an increasing and continuous utility
function over prizes u : X ! R and a disappointment aversion coefﬁcient b 2 ( 1;¥) such that





The term in the denominator normalizes the weights on the prizes so that they sum to one. When
b > 0, disappointing outcomes are overweighted and the DM is called disappointment averse.
When b < 0, disappointing outcomes are underweighted and the DM is called elation seeking.
When b = 0, the model reduces to the model of expected utility.
In Gul’s model, risk aversion is captured by both the concavity of u (as in expected utility)
and the value of b. In particular, Gul (1991, Proposition 3) shows that the DM is risk averse if
and only if u is concave and b  0. Unlike expected utility, the model of disappointment aversion
partially disentangles risk attitude and the shape of utility over monetary outcomes. Fixing a
concave utility u over prizes, a larger (positive) disappointment aversion coefﬁcient increases a
DM’s risk aversion (and disappointment aversion) and strictly reduces his utility from any risky
lottery. (See Gul (1991, Proposition 5)).
3.1. Folding back T-stage lotteries
The primitive of our model is a preference relation over the set of T-stage lotteries. The model
of disappointment aversion can be extended to this richer domain recursively (see Artstein-Avidan
5and Dillenberger (2010) or Dillenberger (2010)) using the folding back approach proposed by Se-
gal (1990). To illustrate, consider a two-stage lottery P = ha1;p1;a2;p2;a3;p3i. First, each lot-
tery pi in the support of P is replaced with its certainty equivalent under disappointment aversion;
that is, the value CE(pi) satisfying u(CE(pi)) =V(pi;u;b). The value of the resulting one-stage,
“folded back” lottery ha1;CE(p1);a2;CE(p2);a3;CE(p3)i is calculated using V( ;u;b) and as-
signed to be the utility of the original lottery P. The value of the temporal lottery is thus calculated
by applying disappointment aversion recursively. For T-stage lotteries, the procedure is analogous.
Lotteries in the last stage are replaced with their certainty equivalent under disappointment aver-
sion, resulting in a (T  1)-stage lottery; and this procedure is repeated until a one-stage lottery
results, whose value is calculated using disappointment aversion.
The “folding back” procedure does not require that the same disappointment aversion coefﬁ-
cient be used throughout. For example, the extent of disappointment aversion may vary with the
passage of time. More generally, the value of a T-stage lottery can be calculated by folding back
using an arbitrary combination of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients.
4. History dependent disappointment aversion
We propose a model of history dependent disappointment aversion over T-stage lotteries, in which
the DM endogenously categorizes each sublottery as an elating or disappointing outcome of the
sublottery from which it emanates. The value of a T-stage lottery PT is calculated by folding
back, where the disappointment aversion coefﬁcient assigned to a sublottery is determined by the
sequence of elating or disappointing outcomes leading to it. In analogy to Gul (1991), the DM’s
categorization must be internally consistent: for example, if a sublottery Pt is considered an elating
outcome of the sublottery Pt+1, then the value of Pt should indeed be larger than that of Pt+1.
We begin by formalizing the notion of histories within T-stage lotteries. A t-stage lottery Pt is
a sublottery of PT if there is a sequence Pt+1;Pt+2;:::;PT such that for every t0 2 ft;:::;T  1g,
Pt0
2 supp Pt0+1. By convention, PT is a sublottery of itself. The initial history—i.e., prior to any
resolution of risk—is empty (0). If a sublottery Pt+1 is degenerate—i.e., leads to some Pt with
probability one—then the DM is not exposed to risk at that stage and his history is unchanged.
If a sublottery Pt+1 is nondegenerate, each sublottery Pt in its support may be an elating (e) or





6For each PT 2 L T, the history assignment a( jPT) assigns a history h 2 H to each sublottery of
PT. The DM’s history assignments for all PT 2 L T are simply denoted a. The initial assignment
(that is, a(PTjPT)=0) is always implicit; e.g., within the two-stage lottery P=ha;p;1 a;qi, we
write a(pjP) = e rather than a(pjP) = 0e if p is elating. If outcome j 2 fe;dg occurs after history
h, the updated history is hj, implicitly assuming the resulting history is in H (i.e., h is a nonterminal
history). The length of a history h (denoted jhj) is the total number of e and d outcomes.
EachhistorycorrespondstoadisappointmentaversioncoefﬁcientinthecollectionB:=fbhgh2H.
We may deﬁne the folding back procedure for a DM who has a utility u, history assignment a, and
a collection of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B. Starting backwards, calculate the certainty
equivalent of each one-stage sublottery p using Equation (1) and ba(pjPT); that is, CEa(pjPT)(p) =
u 1(V(p;u;ba(pjPT))). Next, consider each two-stage sublottery P = ha1;p1;:::;am;pmi and
use ba(PjPT) to calculate the certainty equivalent of the “folded back” one-stage lottery in which
each p in the support of P is replaced with its certainty equivalent calculated above; that is,
ha1;CEa(p1jPT)(p1);:::;am;CEa(pmjPT)(pm)i. Continuing in this manner, the T-stage lottery is re-
duced to a one-stage lottery (over the certainty equivalents of its continuation sublotteries) whose
value is calculated using b0, since a(PTjPT) = 0.
Our model of history dependent disappointment aversion (HDDA), deﬁned below, places re-
striction on the history assignments permitted in the folding back procedure.
Deﬁnition 1 (History dependent disappointment aversion, HDDA). AnHDDAutilityrepresen-
tation over T-stage lotteries consists of an increasing and continuous utility over monetary prizes
u:X !R, a collection of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B=fbhgh2H, and a history assign-
ment a satisfying, for each PT 2 L T,
1. Sequential assignment. The DM assigns histories to all sublotteries of PT sequentially
(i) if Pt+1 is nondegenerate and Pt 2 supp Pt+1 then a(PtjPT) 2 fa(Pt+1jPT)gfe;dg;
(ii) if Pt+1 is degenerate and Pt 2 supp Pt+1 then a(PtjPT) = a(Pt+1jPT).
2. Folding back. The utility of PT is calculated by folding back using u, a, and B. We let
V(Pt;u;a;BjPT) denote the value of any sublottery Pt of PT calculated as such, simply writ-
ing V(PT;u;a;B) for the value of PT.
3. Internal consistency. Within PT, if Pt 2 supp Pt+1 is an elating (disappointing) outcome of a
nondegenerate sublottery Pt+1, then the value of Pt calculated above must be weakly larger
than (strictly smaller than) the value of Pt+1 in PT. For example, if a(Pt+1jPT) = h and
a(PtjPT) = he, thenV(Pt;u;a;BjPT) V(Pt+1;u;a;BjPT).
7We identify a DM with an HDDA representation by the triple (u;a;B) satisfying the above condi-
tions.
In the above, we assumed a DM considers an outcome of a nondegenerate lottery elating if
its value is at least as large as the value of the lottery from which it emanates. Alternatively,
one could redeﬁne HDDA so that an outcome is disappointing if its value is at least as small
as that of the parent lottery; or even introduce a third assignment, neutral (n), which treats the
case of equality differently than elation or disappointment.3 Unlike in the one-stage model of
disappointment aversion, how equality is treated affects the value of the lottery; but in either case,
equality is possible only in a measure zero set of lotteries. Generically, a nonempty history consists
of a sequence of strict elations and disappointments.
To illustrate how HDDA is determined, consider the case of two-stage lotteries, where sequen-
tial history assignment is trivially satisﬁed. There are three disappointment aversion coefﬁcients,
B=fb0;be;bdg. Foranyone-stagelottery p2L 1 andh2f0;e;dg,CEh(p)isthedisappointment
aversion certainty equivalent of p using u and bh. If a two-stage lottery P is degenerate (i.e., P =
h1;pi) thenV(P;u;a;B) is simply the disappointment aversion value of p under b0, orV(p;u;b0).
For any nondegenerate two-stage lottery P=ha1;p1;:::;a j;pj;:::;am;pmi, the HDDA represen-
tation assigns to each one-stage lottery p in the support of P a history a(pjP) 2 fe;dg, and the
value of P is given by
V (P;u;a;B) =








1+b0åfj j a(pjjP)=dga j
: (2)










4.1. Overreaction to news and the primacy effect
We say that an HDDA representation using the collection of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients
B has endogenous reference dependence if bhe 6= bhd for all h.4 In this section we show that under
endogenous reference dependence, the existence of an HDDA representation implies regularity
3If a(pjP) = n, then for any perturbation of p to p0 in P, resulting in a perturbed lottery P0, a(pjP0) 6= n. That is,
in each neighborhood of a neutral point, there is an elation or a disappointment. If sufﬁciently close to a neutral point
there is an elation, then be bn. If sufﬁciently close to a neutral point there is a disappointment, then bn bd. (Refer
to Lemma 4).
4Relaxing this condition to be satisﬁed for only some h would lead to more cumbersome conditions.
8properties on B that are related to well-known cognitive biases; and that in turn, these properties
imply the existence of HDDA.5
As discussed in the introduction, experimental evidence suggests that an individual’s risk atti-
tudes depend on how prior uncertainty resolved. In particular, the literature suggests that people
overreact to news received: they become less risk averse after positive experiences and more risk
averse after negative ones. Since risk aversion is increasing in the disappointment aversion coefﬁ-
cient, this effect is captured in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2. The collection of coefﬁcients B overreacts to news if bhe < bhd for all h.
A body of evidence also suggests that individuals are affected by the position of items in a
sequence. One well-documented cognitive bias is the primacy effect, in which early observations
have a strong effect on later judgments. In our setting, the order in which elations and disappoint-
ments occur might affect the DM’s risk attitude. Overreaction to news suggests that after an initial
elation, a disappointment increases the DM’s risk aversion; and that after an initial disappointment,
an elation reduces the DM’s risk aversion. A primacy effect would further suggest that the shift
in attitude from the initial realization has a lasting and disproportionate effect. Future elations
or disappointments can only mitigate but not overpower the ﬁrst impression, as in the following
deﬁnition.
For any t, let dt (or et) denote t repetitions of d (or e). The history hedt, for example, corre-
sponds to experiencing one elation and t successive disappointments after the history h, under the
implicit assumption that the resulting history is in H.
Deﬁnition 3. The collection of coefﬁcients B displays a weak primacy effect if bhed  bhde for all
h. The collection B displays a strong primacy effect if bhedt  bhdet for all h and t  1.
Thecombinationofoverreactiontonewsandthestrongprimacyeffectimplystrongrestrictions
on the collection of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B; these are formalized in the following
result and visualized in Figure 1. We refer below to the lexicographic order on histories of the same
length as the ordering where ˜ h precedes h if it precedes it alphabetically. Since d comes before e,
this is interpreted as “the DM is disappointed earlier in ˜ h than in h.”
5It is easy to check that if b0 = bhe = bhd for every h (as in the standard history-independent recursive disappoint-
ment aversion), then an HDDA representation exists: it is trivial for history assignments to be internally consistent
because the assignment does not affect value.
9be bd
bee bed bde bdd
beee beed bede bedd bdee bded bdde bddd
Figure 1: Starting from the bottom, each row corresponds to the set of applicable disappointment
aversion coefﬁcients for a stage t = 2;3;:::;T. Overreaction to news and the primacy effect imply
thelexicographicorderingofdisappointmentaversioncoefﬁcientsineachrow(Proposition1). The
assumption bh 2 [bhe;bhd] for all h 2 H implies the vertical lines and consecutive row alignment.
Proposition 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) B satisﬁes overreaction to news and the strong primacy effect (with strict inequalities);
(ii) For h;˜ h of the same length, bh < b ˜ h if ˜ h precedes h lexicographically.
Under the assumption bh 2 [bhe;bhd] for all h 2 H, conditions (i) and (ii) are also equivalent to:
(iii) For any h;h0;h00, we have bheh0 < bhdh00.
Condition (ii) of Proposition 1 says, comparing histories of the same length, that the DM’s risk
aversion is greater when he has been disappointed earlier. This implies that for all h;˜ h,
bhej˜ hj+1  bhe˜ h  bhedj˜ hj < bhdej˜ hj  bhd˜ h  bhdj˜ hj+1;
meaning that the DM’s risk aversion after any continuation ˜ h is no greater than if she were to be
consistentlydisappointedthereafter, andnolessthanifsheweretobeconsistentlyelatedthereafter.
To show the lexicographic ordering across the rows in Figure 1, note that the ﬁrst row from the
bottom (be < bd) follows directly from overreaction to news. Overreaction to news also implies
the left and right portions of the second row (bee < bed and bde < bdd) while the primacy effect
(with strict inequalities) implies that bed <bde. Alternating the use of overreaction to news and the
strong primacy effect, one obtains each of the rows in Figure 1. Under the additional assumption
bh 2 [bhe;bhd], which says that an elation reduces (and a disappointment increases) the DM’s
risk aversion relative to his initial level, one obtains the condition (iii), represented graphically in
the vertical lines and consecutive row alignment in Figure 1. In words, condition (iii) says that
10whatever happens afterwards, the DM’s risk aversion is always lower after an elation than it would
have been had she instead been disappointed at that same point in time.
The following results link the two cognitive biases mentioned above to necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for the existence of an HDDA representation.
Theorem 1 (Necessary conditions for HDDA). IftheHDDArepresentation(u;a;B)hasendoge-
nous reference dependence, then the collection B overreacts to news and displays a weak primacy
effect. If in addition bh 2 [bhe;bhd] and bhedt 6= bhdet for all h and t, then the collection B also
displays a strong primacy effect (and is ordered as in Figure 1).
Theorem 2 (Sufﬁcient conditions for HDDA). If the collection of disappointment aversion co-
efﬁcients B overreacts to news and displays a strong primacy effect (with strict inequalities), then
for any continuous and strictly increasing utility over prizes u : X ! R, an HDDA representation
(u;a;B) exists.
Observe that on the set of two-stage lotteries, L 2, overreaction to news is by itself necessary
and sufﬁcient for an HDDA representation with endogenous reference dependence, as there are too
few stages for the primacy effect to apply. Similarly, on L 3, overreaction to news and the weak
primacy effect are both necessary and sufﬁcient.
Theorems 1 and 2 are proved in the appendix. There we provide an algorithm for ﬁnd-
ing an internally consistent history assignment for two-stage lotteries, which can be used re-
cursively to prove existence of the HDDA representation for T-stage lotteries. Let us illustrate
why overreaction to news is necessary under endogenous reference dependence. Suppose T =
2 and consider the lottery P = ha;p;1 a;dxi. For p to be an elation in P, internal consis-
tency requires u(CEe(p)) > u(x); for p to be a disappointment in P, internal consistency requires
u(CEd(p)) < u(x). If CEd(p) > CEe(p), then there cannot be an internally consistent assign-
ment for any x 2 (CEe(p);CEd(p)). Then it must be, by endogenous reference dependence, that
CEd(p) < CEe(p); and by the properties of disappointment aversion, this implies be < bd. To
sketch the proof that the weak primacy effect is necessary under T = 3, consider a three-stage lot-
tery Q3 = ha;Q;1 a;d
2
xi. Assuming by contradiction that bde < bed, we construct a two-stage
lottery Q such that CEd(Q) >CEe(Q) under the only possible internally consistent assignment of
Q given each of be and bd. But then, as above, no internally consistent assignment of Q3 would
exist. Essentially, if bde < bed then an elating outcome received after a disappointment may over-
turn the assignment of the initial outcome as a disappointment. The intuition for the strong primacy





Win $100 Win $0
1/2 1/4 1/4
Lottery p Win $100 Win $0
1/2
Win $100 Win $0






Win $100 Win $0
1/2 1/4 1/4
Lottery p Win $100 Win $0
1/2
Win $100 Win $0
(in addition to previously won $100)
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Let p be any lottery whose support consists of prizes between $25 and $331
3. Then ﬁgure
(b) shows the only internally consistent history assignment for the three-stage lottery shown in (a),
using be = 1, bd = 2, and u(x) = x. The lottery p is a disappointment after ﬁrst winning $100, and
an elation otherwise. Note that with u(x) = x, there cannot be any wealth effects on risk aversion.
5. Implications
In this section we discuss two phenomena that arise under HDDA, statistically cycling disappoint-
ment attitudes and the possibility of “gray areas” where two DM’s, facing the same information
and having the same u and B, may disagree on which outcomes are elating or disappointing (the
history assignment a) based on their optimistic or pessimistic tendencies. Further implications are
studied in Section 6, in a richer setting where intermediate actions may be taken while uncertainty
resolves.
5.1. Disappointment cycles
Theorem 1 says that a DM with an HDDA representation overreacts to news. To illustrate the
implications of this, consider the three-stage lottery P3 shown in Figure 2(a). We assume u(x) =
x, be = 1, bd = 2, and any choice of the other disappointment aversion coefﬁcients satisfying
overreaction to news and the weak primacy effect.
Suppose that p is a lottery whose support consists of prizes between $25 and $331
3. Then, the
two-stage sublottery P` on the left—where the DM immediately accrues $100—must be elating in
P3, while the two-stage sublottery Pr on the right must be disappointing in P3. Indeed, this is the
only internally consistent history assignment because the worst outcome in P` dominates the best
outcome in Pr. Therefore, P` is evaluated using be, and Pr is evaluated using bd.




4;d100i. Because u(x)= x, there are no wealth effects: incrementing
12all the prizes in P by 100 simply raises its HDDA utility by 100, without affecting which outcomes
are elating or disappointing. To calculate the value of P using HDDA, we fold it back by replacing
p with its certainty equivalent calculated using the appropriate history assignment. Within each of




4;100i that would result if p is replaced with a prize x. Using disappointment aversion,
it is easy to show that using be = 1, any prize x smaller than $331
3 is a disappointment in this
lottery; while using bd = 2, any prize x larger than $25 is an elation. But the certainty equivalent
of p, evaluated using any b, is always between $25 and $331
3. Therefore, the only consistent
assignment of p is as a disappointment after winning $100 and as an elation otherwise. That is, the
DM’s disappointment attitude must cycle, as shown in Figure 2(b).
This example suggests a more general prediction of HDDA. Note that in Gul (1991)’s original
model, the disappointment aversion coefﬁcient affects both risk aversion and the elation threshold.
Because the utility of the lottery determines its certainty equivalent, increasing b lowers the DM’s
elation threshold: for any p 2 L 1 and b
0 < b, if a prize x is (1) disappointing in p under b then
it is disappointing in p under b
0, and (2) elating in p under b
0 then it is elating in p under b.
Because of this feature, overreaction to news means, in our dynamic setting, that a DM who has
been elated is not only less risk averse than a DM who has been disappointed, but also has a higher
elation threshold. In other words, overreaction to news implies that after a disappointment, the
DM is more risk averse and “settles for less”; whereas after an elation, the DM is less risk averse
and “raises the bar.” As is in the example above, this leads to statistically cycling disappointment
attitudes: disappointment is more likely after elation, and vice versa.
Undertheassumptionthatbh 2[bhe;bhd]forallh, HDDAimpliescondition(iii)inProposition
1 (visualized in Figure 1). That condition says that after an elation, the DM’s greatest possible
degree of risk aversion in the future decreases; and conversely, after a disappointment, the DM’s
lowest possible degree of risk aversion in the future increases. However, in a ﬁnite horizon setting,
this does not imply that the DM’s mood swings moderate in intensity with experience (for example,
jbed bejjbede bedjjbeded bedej). That is, the intensity of disappointment cycles may
well persist.
5.2. Is the glass half full or half empty?
Consider the two stage lottery ha;p;1 a;dxi and suppose that u(CEe(p)) > u(x) > u(CEd(p)).
Under this assumption, it would be consistent for the lottery p to be either an elation or a disap-
pointment. The moral of this example is that while u, the collection B, and history assignment a
can be pinned down uniquely by choice behavior (as shown by the axiomatization in Section 7),








Figure 3: The set of possible HDDA utilities of P(w) are pictured on the vertical axis for each
w 2 (0;1) on the horizontal axis, given be = 0, b0 = 1, bd = 2, and u(x) = x. The sublottery p(w)
can be viewed as an elation or a disappointment in the range [w;w].
one cannot fully reconstruct the DM’s preference relation from only the information contained in
u and B. Predicting the DM’s behavior in such “gray areas” as above requires a theory of how
the DM assigns histories (as seen later, such a theory has testable predictions for his preference
relation over L T).
A dictionary deﬁnition of optimism is “An inclination to put the most favorable construction
upon actions and events or to anticipate the best possible outcome.”6 In our setting, optimism
and pessimism may be understood in terms of this multiplicity of internally consistent history
assignments, where the optimist always chooses the most favorable one and the pessimist chooses
the least favorable one.
Deﬁnition 4. We say that a DM is an optimist if for every PT 2 L T he chooses the sequential
and internally consistent history assignment a that maximizes his HDDA utility V(PT;u;a;B).
Similarly, we say the DM is a pessimist if for every PT 2 L T he chooses the sequential and
internally consistent assignment a that minimizes his HDDA utilityV(PT;u;a;B). Given the same
utility over prizes u and disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B, we say that one DM is more
optimistic than another if his HDDA utility is higher for every PT 2 L T.
The optimist and pessimist agree on fundamentals (their utility from monetary prizes and their
disappointment aversion coefﬁcients), but they take a different perspective on what outcomes are
disappointing and elating. This approach differs from most models of optimism and pessimism,
which typically view optimism in terms of attaching higher probability to positive events. Under
HDDA, probabilities are objective and unchanging, but endogenous reference dependence allows
6“optimism.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010. http://www.merriam-webster.com (14 June 2010).
14the DM to select an internally consistent view of the unfolding risk according to his optimistic or
pessimistic tendency.
To illustrate, consider Figure 3, which depicts for each w 2 (0;1) all possible HDDA values
of the two-stage lottery P(w) = h1
3;d1; 1
3;d2; 1
3;p(w)i where p(w) = hw;3;1 w;0i. An increase
in w is a ﬁrst-order stochastic improvement of the risky sublottery p(w). While p(w) is unam-
biguously elating (disappointing) for high (low) values of w, there is an intermediate range [w;w]
where p(w) can be viewed either as an elation or as a disappointment. The certainty equivalents
of the other sublotteries are independent of their history assignment because they are degenerate.
At the same time, overreaction to news implies CEe(p(w)) >CEd(p(w)). Because HDDA utility
is increasing in the certainty equivalents, viewing p(w) as an elation gives higher utility. The op-
timist thus views p(w) as an elation as soon as possible (for all w  w). On the other hand, the
pessimist views p(w) as a disappointment for as long as possible (for all w  w). More generally,
a DM may have a cutoff w 2 [w;w] at which p(w) switches from a disappointment to an elation.
If one DM is more optimistic than another, then his cutoff w must be lower.
It is easy to see that overreaction to news implies that a DM with an HDDA representation
may violate ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance on T-stage lotteries: for example, if the probability
a of p is very high, the lottery ha;p;1 a;dwi may be preferred to ha;p;1 a;dbi; the “thrill
of winning” outweighs the “pain of losing.” The above example suggests, however, that both the
optimist and pessimist satisfy the following regularity property related to ﬁrst-order dominance,
stated for simplicity for T = 2.
Proposition 2. Let  be the preference relation represented by the DM’s HDDA utility on L 2,
andlet>FOSD denotetheﬁrst-orderstochasticdominancerelationonL 1. Fixanyprizesx1;:::;xm 1
and probabilities a1;:::;am. If the DM is an optimist or a pessimist, then7
ha1;dx1;:::;am 1;dxm 1;am;pi  ha1;dx1;:::;am 1;dxm 1;am;qi whenever p >FOSD q: (3)
The idea behind Proposition 2 is that ﬁxing p as either an elation or a disappointment, the
utility of P(w) is increasing in w; and viewing p as an elation gives strictly higher utility for each
w. The fact that the other sublotteries are degenerate ensures that the history assignment of p
does not affect their value. Consider instead a lottery ha;p;1 a;qi, where both p;q are risky
and p >FOSD q. Fixing any b, the certainty equivalent of p is larger than that of q by ﬁrst-order
dominance; hence it would always be consistent to label p as an elation and q as a disappointment.
7More generally, any DM whose history assignment a applies a cutoff for viewing the risky lottery as an elation
(as in the above discussion) will also satisfy Property (3).
15However, ifCEe(q)>CEd(p) then it would also be consistent to label p as a disappointment and q
as an elation; and if the probability 1 a of q is sufﬁciently high, the optimist may achieve a higher
HDDA utility by doing so. The intuition is that by viewing a high probability, riskier prospect as
an elation (if it is consistent to do so), the optimist puts a “positive spin” on the uncertainty. (A
similar feature applies for the pessimist.)
6. HDDA with intermediate choices
We now extend the HDDA model to the setting of stochastic decision trees. Roughly speaking,
a stochastic decision tree is a lottery over choice sets of shorter stochastic decision trees. In each
choice set, the DM can choose the continuation stochastic decision tree. Formally, for any set Z, let
K(Z) be the set of ﬁnite, nonempty subsets of Z. A one-stage stochastic decision tree is simply a
one-stage lottery. The set of one-stage stochastic decision trees is D1 = L 1, with typical elements
p;q. For t = 2;::;T, the set of ﬁnite, nonempty sets of (t  1)-stage stochastic decision trees is
given by A t 1 = K(Dt 1), with typical elements At 1;Bt 1. Then the set of t-stage stochastic
decision trees is the set of lotteries over ﬁnite choice sets of (t  1)-stage stochastic decision trees.
Formally, the set of t-stage stochastic decision trees is Dt = L(A t 1), with typical elements
Pt;Qt. Our domain is thus DT = L(A T 1). (Our previous domain of T-stage lotteries can be
seen as the case in which all choice sets are degenerate.)
The realization of a t-stage stochastic decision tree is a choice set, which is categorized by
the DM as either elating or disappointing. The set of possible histories, H, is the same as before,
with the understanding that histories now refer to choice sets. We abuse notation and identify the




The folding back procedure may be extended to this richer domain in a way that the history
assignment of a choice set determines the disappointment aversion coefﬁcient applied to each
stochastic decision tree inside it, and the value of the choice set itself is the maximal value of those
stochastic decision trees. Formally, the certainty equivalent of each set of one-stage stochastic
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j) with its certainty equiva-
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Continuing in this manner, the T-stage stochastic decision tree is reduced to a one-stage lottery
(over the certainty equivalents of its continuation subtrees) whose value is calculated using b0,
since a(ATjPT) = 0.
The deﬁnition of HDDA is almost the same as before.
Deﬁnition 5 (HDDA with intermediate choices). An HDDA utility representation over T-stage
stochastic decision trees consists of an increasing and continuous utility over monetary prizes
u:X !R, a collection of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B=fbhgh2H, and a history assign-
ment a satisfying, for each PT 2 DT,
1. Sequential assignment. The DM assigns histories to all realizations of stochastic decision
subtrees of DT: Let a(ATjPT) := b0 and, recursively, for t < T :
(i) if Pt+1 is nondegenerate and At 2suppPt+1 2At+1 thena(AtjPT)2a(At+1jPT)fe;dg:
(ii) if Pt+1 is degenerate and and At 2supp Pt+1 2 At+1 then a(AtjPT) = a(At+1jPT):
2. Folding back. The DM calculates the utility of the stochastic decision tree by folding back.
We let V(At;u;a;BjPT) and V(Pt;u;a;BjPT) denote, respectively, the value of any choice
set At in PT and subtree Pt of PT, as calculated above, simply writing V(PT;u;a;B) for the
value of PT.
3. Internal consistency. Within PT, for each nondegenerate Pt+1, if At 2supp Pt+1 is an elating
(disappointing) outcome in Pt+1, then the value of At must be weakly larger than (strictly
smaller than) the value of Pt+1 in AT.
Observe that the DM is dynamically consistent under HDDA with intermediate actions. From
any future choice set, the DM anticipates selecting the best stochastic decision tree. That choice
leads to an internally consistent history assignment of that choice set. Thus, when reaching a
choice set, the disappointment aversion coefﬁcient she uses to value the choices therein is the one
she anticipated using, and her choice is precisely her anticipated choice.
Internal consistency is therefore a stronger requirement than before, because it takes optimal
choices into account. However, our previous results on the restrictions that internal consistency
17imposes on how history affects disappointment aversion extend to the model of HDDA with inter-
mediate actions.
Theorem 3 (Extension of previous results). The conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 (necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions for HDDA) also hold for HDDA with intermediate actions.
6.1. Implications
Actions that can be taken while risk unfolds may arise naturally in various settings. Under HDDA,
the DM’s risk taking behavior may depend on her history—she overreacts to news, and satisﬁes
primacy effects. For example, overreaction to news suggests that a basketball player might attempt
more difﬁcult shots after a string of successful ones. Rao (2009), for example, ﬁnds evidence to
this effect within the NBA, and uses this as an explanation for the “hot hand” fallacy, which is the
belief that a winning streak indicates future success (even in independent events).8
ThebiasespredictedbyHDDA,particularlytheprimacyeffect, mayalsobeexploitedbyagents
who can manipulate the presentation of information to affect the DM’s behavior. For example, con-
sider a ﬁnancial advisor trying to sell a risky investment to a DM who has an HDDA representation
(u;a;B), with utility over monetary prizes u(x) = x and strictly positive disappointment aversion
coefﬁcients ordered as in Figure 1. The risky investment, which requires an initial payment of I, is
an even chance gamble between I+U and I D. The DM knows that the upside,U, and downside,
D, are independently and uniformly distributed on f0;500;1000g. The ﬁnancial advisor receives a
commission whenever the DM invests and is informed about the true values of U and D. The DM
may consult with the ﬁnancial advisor at no cost to learn U and D, and may choose whether or
not to invest based on the information provided. The ﬁnancial advisor is obligated to tell the truth
aboutU and D, but can reveal this information in any order.9
It is straightforward to check that without any information, the DM prefers not to invest. Hence
the DM chooses to consult with the advisor. Suppose the ﬁnancial advisor has some good news and
someslightlyworsenews: theupsideishigh(U =1000)butthedownsideismoderate(D=500).10
How should she reveal this? Since the ﬁnancial advisor knows the DM’s preferences, she can
8Unlike previous studies, such as Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985), Rao controls for shot difﬁculty (i.e., taking
more or less difﬁcult shots after successes or failures) and shows that risk taking behavior —but not ability—is affected
by previous outcomes.
9We assume for simplicity that the DM accepts the information the ﬁnancial advisor gives in that order, without
making inferences (this is an assumption often made in the context of framing effects); relaxing this assumption is
interesting but beyond the scope of this example.
10This is the only case in which manipulation is possible. It is clear that when learningU = 0, the DM would never
invest; when learning D = 0, the DM would always invest; and that the DM would not invest if U = D and he has
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Figure 4: The stochastic decision tree that the DM faces when the ﬁnancial advisor (a) reveals the
upside ﬁrst and the downside later or (b) reveals the downside ﬁrst and the upside later. For given
U;D, the choice set A(D;U) = fdI;h:5;I+U;:5;I Dig corresponds to either investing or not.
predict his choice based on how she provides information about U and D. For U = 1000 and D =
500, the DM will invest if the disappointment aversion coefﬁcient used to evaluate the investment
is smaller than one. The primacy effect suggests that conveying the best news ﬁrst increases the
DM’s inclination to invest. This can be formalized by applying HDDA to the stochastic decision
trees in Figure 4, which describe the DM’s problem when the ﬁnancial advisor revealsU or D ﬁrst.
For a wide range of disappointment aversion coefﬁcients (for example, if bh 2 [:5;1:5] for all h
and bed < 1 < bde), the DM is immediately disappointed when D = 500 is mentioned ﬁrst, and
wouldn’t invest even upon hearingU =1000; while the DM is immediately elated whenU =1000
is mentioned ﬁrst, and invests even upon hearing D = 500. Therefore, the ﬁnancial advisor should
reveal the best news ﬁrst to minimize the DM’s subsequent risk aversion and ensure he invests.
7. Axiomatic foundations for HDDA on two-stage lotteries
In this section, we present axioms necessary and sufﬁcient for a preference  on the set of two-
stage lotteries, L 2, to have an HDDA representation (with uniquely identiﬁed u, B, and history
assignment a). This simpliﬁed setting allows for the clearest exposition of the underlying ideas;
we discuss the extension to more stages in Section 7.1.
For two-stage lotteries, an HDDA representation consists of an increasing and continuous util-
ity over prizes u : X ! R, an internally consistent and sequential history assignment a, and dis-
appointment aversion coefﬁcients B = fb0;be;bdg. The value of degenerate lottery P = h1;pi is
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Figure 5: As the lottery p is varied, (a) corresponds to the objects inducing the relation e;a, (b)
corresponds to d;a; and (c) corresponds to 0.
is given by
V (P;u;a;B) =








1+b0åfj j a(pjjP)=dga j
;
where for each h 2 fe;dg, CEh(p) is the certainty equivalent of p calculated using (1) with u and
bh. Recall further that internal consistency means, for example, that if p is elating in P (i.e.,
a(pjP) = e) then it should indeed be thatCEe(p) is weakly larger thanV(P;u;a;B).
In some two-stage lotteries, which history to assign to each realization can be determined by a
quick inspection. For example, this is true of all the lotteries depicted in Figure 5. In the lottery in
Figure 5(b), which has the form ha;p;1 a;dbi, receiving the lottery p is disappointing compared
to receiving the best monetary prize (b) with certainty.11 How should the DM compare the two-
stage lotteries P = ha;p;1 a;dbi and Q = ha;q;1 a;dbi, which both have this form? Both
p and q are disappointing in P and Q, respectively, and are received with the same probability a.
According to HDDA, bd must be applied to evaluate both p and q in the representation according
to disappointment aversion, and the value of db is ﬁxed at u(b). Therefore, the preference over P
and Q should be determined by the utilities of p and q according to disappointment aversion, using
u and bd.
We deﬁne e;a on L 1 by p e;a q if ha;dw;1 a;pi  ha;dw;1 a;qi. Similarly, we
deﬁne d;a on L 1 by p d;a q if ha;db;1 a;pi  ha;db;1 a;qi and 0 on L 1 by p 0 q if
h1;pi  h1;qi. These relations are induced from preferences over the objects in Figure 5.
Our ﬁrst axiom requires that these relations, induced from , each has a one-stage disappoint-
ment aversion representation. Axioms for one-stage disappointment aversion are well-known and
provided in Gul (1991).
11Except in the knife-edge case that p = db; however in that case the utility of the entire lottery is u(b) regardless
of how p is labeled, and so not affecting Axiom DA.
20Axiom DA (Disappointment aversion). The relations e;a, d;a, and 0 (induced from )
have a disappointment aversion representation with common utility over prizes u (up to afﬁne
transformations).
As shown in Gul (1991), in any representation of the form (1), b is unique and u is unique up
to afﬁne transformation. The requirement of a common u captures the idea that how risk unfolds
affects risk attitude through disappointment attitudes but not through the DM’s actual utility over
monetary prizes.12 Axiom DA does allow the disappointment aversion coefﬁcients after each
history to differ.
Our next axiom says that “no news” does not affect the DM’s attitude toward risks. If he knows
that his monetary winnings will be determined by a one-stage lottery p, he does not care whether
the uncertainty in p is resolved now or later. Hence the DM’s risk attitude is not affected by the
mere passage of time, but rather only by previous disappointments and elations.
Axiom TN (Time neutrality). For all p 2 L 1, hp(x1);dx1;p(x2);dx2;:::;p(xm);dxni  h1;pi.
Recall that the procedure of folding back a two-stage lottery involves replacing each one-stage
lottery with its certainty equivalent. In HDDA, p is an elation in ha;dw;1 a;pi for each a 2
(0;1). We say that a prize x is an a-elation certainty equivalent of p if it solves ha;dw;1 a;pi
ha;dw;1 a;dxi (the a-disappointment certainty equivalent is deﬁned analogously). By Axiom
DA, it is clear that there exists a unique a-elation certainty equivalent for each p (and similarly
for disappointment). The next axiom says these certainty equivalents depend only on the history
assignment of p, independently of the probability with which it occurs.
Axiom CE (Uniform certainty equivalence). Take any p 2 L 1, x 2 X, and z 2 fw;bg. If
ha;dz;1 a;pi  ha;dz;1 a;dxi for some a 2 (0;1), then ha0;dz;1 a0;pi  ha0;dz;1 
a0;dxi for all a0 2 (0;1).
We deﬁne CEe;(p), the elation certainty equivalent of p, as the value solving ha;dw;1 
a;pi  ha;dw;1 a;dCEe;(p)i for all a 2 (0;1). The disappointment certainty equivalent of p,
CEd;(p), is analogously deﬁned.
12In particular, a behavioral implication of this assumption is that the DM’s Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion
after each history are the same (see Gul (1991, Theorem 4)), assuming twice-differentiability of u. Since we only
know from the fact that u is increasing on the bounded interval X that it is differentiable except on a measure-zero set,
unchanging u implies a constant relative marginal rate of substitution (MRS) condition where the derivatives exist.
Our proof of the representation takes this route, showing that Axiom DA can be broken up into a requirement of
disappointment aversion on each of these sets and such an MRS condition.
21Recall that in the one-stage theory of disappointment aversion, each prize is categorized as an
elating, neutral, or disappointing outcome; and if a prize is considered elating, for example, then it
must be preferred to the lottery as a whole. In analogy, HDDA requires that if a one-stage lottery
p is elating in a two-stage lottery P, then it must indeed be preferred to P as a whole. To study the
minimal departure that permits history dependence, HDDA assumes the certainty equivalent of a
lottery p in P is affected only by its assigned history h (and therefore the same as calculated within
Lh(a)). This motivates the following deﬁnitions. Consider P = ha1;p1;:::;a j;pj;::: am;pmi.
We say pj is elating in P if
P  ha1;p1;:::;a j;dCEe;(pj);::: am;pmi  h1;dCEe;(pj)i:
Similarly, we say pj is disappointing in P if
P  ha1;p1;:::;a j;dCEd;(pj);::: am;pmi  h1;dCEd;(pj)i:
Our ﬁnal axiom says that the preference  always allows the DM to categorize a realization pj
of a two-stage lottery P according to one of the possibilities above.
Axiom CAT (Categorization). For any nondegenerate P 2 L 2 and any p 2 supp P, p is either
elating or disappointing in P.
These axioms are equivalent to an HDDA representation on two-stage lotteries.
Theorem 4 (Representation).  on L 2 satisﬁes Axioms DA, TN, CE, and CAT if and only if
it admits a history-dependent disappointment aversion (HDDA) representation with some contin-
uous and increasing utility over monetary prizes u : X ! R, history assignment a and a set of
disappointment aversion coefﬁcients B = fb0;be;bdg.
In the theorem above, the disappointment aversion coefﬁcients are unique; u is unique up to
positive afﬁne transformation; and with endogenous reference dependence, the history assignment
is uniquely determined for each P2L 2 except in knife-edge cases that two decompositions would
give P the same value.
7.1. Extending to three or more stages
With an appropriate modiﬁcation of the axioms, Theorem 4 can be extended to represent prefer-
ences over (arbitrary) T-stage lotteries. In this section, we highlight the required changes for the
22case T = 3; the more general case is similarly analyzed.
We must ﬁrst generalize the sets of compound lotteries for which the history assignment of any
ﬁnal stage lottery, p, is unambiguous. For example, consider a lottery of the form ha;d
2
w;1 a;Pi,
where P is of the form ha0;db;1 a0;pi. Here, the lottery p must have the history assignment h =
ed. We may deﬁne an induced preference ed;(a;a0) on L 1, and similarly for other possible history
assignments. Axiom DA requires that these induced preference relations have disappointment
aversion representations, and that the utility over prizes u is common (up to afﬁne transformation)
in all these representations. The deﬁnition of the certainty equivalent of a sublottery is extended





for all a;a0. Axiom CE then says that conditional on each history, the certainty equivalent of a
sublottery is independent of the probability with which it is received.
For any given single-stage lottery p, there are three compound lotteries in which the only
nondegenerate sublottery is the one where p is fully resolved. Axiom TN requires that the DM be









Lastly, Axiom CAT requires that a sublottery can be replaced by a degenerate lottery that gives
the history dependent certainty equivalent of this sublottery for sure, with the consistency condition
taking into account the history assignment of the sublottery. For example, if a one-stage lottery
p 2 supp P = ha0;db;1 a0;pi is replaced by its certainty equivalent after history h = ed, then it










8. Conclusion and directions for future research
We propose and axiomatize a model of history dependent disappointment aversion, in which risk
attitudes depend endogenously on prior disappointments and elations. The HDDA model predicts
that the DM satisﬁes two well-documented cognitive biases, overreaction to news and the primacy
effect, as well as disappointment cycles; the DM raises the threshold for elation after positive
23experiences but is willing to “settle for less” after negative ones, making disappointment more
likely after elation and vice-versa.
To study endogenous reference dependence under the minimal departure from recursive dis-
appointment aversion, HDDA posits the categorization of each sublottery as either elating or dis-
appointing. The DM’s risk attitudes depend on the prior sequence of disappointments or elations,
but not on the “intensity” of those experiences. We are also interested in extending the HDDA
model to permit such dependence. That extension raises several questions, beginning with how to
deﬁne the intensity of elation or disappointment and how internal consistency is to be understood.
The testable implications of such a model depend on whether it is possible to identify the extent
to which a realization is disappointing, as that designation depends on the extent to which other
options are elating or disappointing.
24A. Appendix
A.1. Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. It is clear that (ii) implies (i), as both overreaction to news and the strong
primacy effect respect the lexicographic ordering. Proving that (i) implies (ii) follows from alter-
nating applications of overreaction to news and the strong primacy effect (with strict inequalities)
starting from the tail of the history. To illustrate, observe that beee < beed by overreaction to news
with h = ee; beed < bede by the strong primacy effect with h = e; bede < bedd by overreaction to
news with h = ed; bedd < bdee by the strong primacy effect with h = 0; and so on and so forth.
Now assume that bh 2 [bhe;bhd] for all h. To see that (iii) implies (i), note that overreaction
to news is implied by taking h0 = h00 = 0; and that the strong primacy effect is implied by taking
h0 =dt and h00 =et. To see that (ii) implies (iii), observe that we know bheh0 <bhedjh0j and bhdejh00j <
bhdh00. Using the strong primacy effect to combine these bounds delivers the result if jh00j > jh0j;
so suppose that jh00j > jh0j (the other argument is symmetric). Then repeated use of the assumption











. For each p 2 L 1 and b 2 ( 1;¥), deﬁne CEb(p) =
u 1(V(p;u;b)). Let
CEb :=CEb(h0:5;dw;0:5;dbi) andCEb :=CEb(h0:5;dw;0:5;dbi):













b ;1 2e;Pti. That is,
in each stage 1;:::;t the lottery Pt+1 gives the worst and the best outcome, both with probability
e and the continuation with the remaining probability. At period t, the continuation lottery is the
lottery p. Note the following:















(iii) For all t, p is elating in P2 = he;dw;e;db;1 2e;pi when P2 is evaluated under bdet and p
is disappointing in P2 when P2 is evaluated under bedt.
25Assume by contradiction that bedt+1 > bdet+1. Then CEbedt+1 (p) < CEbdet+1 (p). Pick e > 0
small enough and apply (ii) and (iii) repeatedly to show that if for t = 1 be is used, then the only
consistent set of continuation betas is bedt; and if for t = 1 bd is used, then the only consistent set





the ﬁrst continuation value (evaluated with be) is less than CEbedt+1 (p)+d and the ﬁrst con-












sistent HDDA history assignment cannot exist.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove each statement separately. Note that by endogenous reference
dependence, bhd 6= bhe for every a.
(i) Overreaction to news. Suppose by contradiction that be > bd. Then for any p 2 L 1,
CEe(p)<CEd(p). Choose any x2(CEe(p);CEd(p)). Let Pt be thet-stage lottery which has
no uncertainty until staget 1 and delivers p at staget 1 with probability one. Observe that
the T-stage lottery ha;PT 1;1 a;d
T 1
x i would have no internally consistent assignment.




T;bi. Analogously, one shows bhe < bhd by constructing the appropriate initial history.
(ii) Weak primacy effect. Given bhe <bhd, shown in (i), bhed <bhde follows immediately from
Lemma 1 for the case t = 0.
(iii) Strong primacy effect. By induction. The initial step is true by part (ii). Assume it is true for
t 1. Note that bh 2[bhe;bhd] and bhedt <bhdet for all t t 1 imply
Tt 1
t=0(bedt;bdet)6=
/ 0. Hence the strong primacy effect follows from Lemma 1 for t as well.
Fix any continuous and increasing u and b 2( 1;¥). For any p2L 1, the endogenous assign-
mentofprizestobeingeitherelatingordisappointingiscalledanelationdisappointmentdecompo-
sition(EDD).Lete(p):=fx 2 supp pju(x) >V (p;u;b)g, n(p):=fx 2 supp pju(x) =V (p;u;b)g
and d(p) := fx 2 supp pju(x) <V (p;u;b)g.
Lemma 2. Take p=hp(x1);x1;:::;p(xj);xj;:::;p(xm);xmiand p0 =hp(x0
1);x0
1;:::;p(xj);xj;:::;p(xm);xmi.
261. If x1 62 d(p) and x0
1 > x1 then x0
1 2 e(p0).
2. If x1 62 e(p) and x0
1 < x1 then x0
1 2 d(p0).













So, suppose that EDD(p) 6= EDD(p0). Note that by monotonicity with respect to ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, x 2d(p))x 2d(p0). So suppose there exists x 2e(p) such that x 2d(p0).






























































































1) u(x1) must be greater than (V (p0) V (p)) to avoid a contradiction (since the
coefﬁcient of (V (p0) V (p)) is greater than p(x1). Since by assumption u(x1) >V (p), we must
have u(x0
1) >V (p0), that is, x0
1 2 e(p0).
Lemma 3. Suppose that for any nondegenerate p 2 L 1, CEe(p) > CEd(p). Then for any non-
degenerate P 2 L 2, a consistent decomposition (using only strict elation and disappointment for
nondegenerate lotteries in its support) exists.
Proof. Consider P = ha1;p1;:::;am;pmi. Suppose for simplicity that all pi are nondegenerate (if
pi = dx is degenerate, then CEe(pi) =CEd(pi) = u(x), so the algorithm can be run on the nonde-
generate sublotteries, with the degenerate ones labeled ex-post according to internal consistency).
Without loss of generality, suppose that the indexing in P is such that p1 2argmaxi=1;:::;m CEe(pi),
pm 2 argmini=2;:::;m CEd(pi), and CEe(p2)  CEe(p3)    CEe(pm 1). A consistent de-
composition is constructed by the following algorithm. Set h1(p1) = e and h1(pj) = d for all
i > 1. Let V1 be the folded back value under h1; if V1 is consistent with h1, the algorithm
and proof are complete. If not, consider i = 2. If u(CEd(p2))  V1, then set h2(p2) = e and
h2(pi) = h1(pi) for all i 6= 2 (if u(CEd(p2)) < V1, let h2(pi) = h1(pi) for all i). Let V2 be the
resulting folded back value. If V2 is consistent with h2, the algorithm and proof are complete. If
not, move to i = 3, and so on and so forth, so long as i  m 1. Notice from Lemma 2 that if
u(CEd(pi)) Vi 1, then u(CEe(pi)) >Vi. Moreover, notice that if u(CEe(pi)) >Vi, then for any
j < i, u(CEe(pj))  u(CEe(pi)) > Vi, so previously switched labels remain strict elations; also,
because Vi Vi 1 for all i, previous disappointments remain disappointments. If the ﬁnal step of
the algorithm reaches i = m 1, notice that CEd(pm) is the lowest disappointment value, there-
fore the lowest value among fCEhm 1(pj)(pj)gj=1;:::;m. Hence, the ﬁnal constructed decomposition
hm 1 is consistent withVm 1.
28Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 3 and overreaction to news, an internally consistent (strict)
elation-disappointment decomposition exists for any nondegenerate P 2 L 2, using any initial b.
By induction, suppose that for any (t  1)-stage lottery an internally consistent history assignment
exists, using any initial b. Consider a t-stage nondegenerate lottery Pt = ha1;Pt 1
1 ;:::;am;Pt 1
m i.
Notice that the algorithm in Lemma 3 for L 2 only uses the fact that CEe(p) > CEd(p) for any
nondegenerate p 2 L 1. But the same algorithm can be used to construct an internally consis-
tent history assignment for Pt if for any Pt 1 2 L t 1, CEe(Pt 1) >CEd(Pt 1). While there may
be multiple consistent decompositions of Pt 1 using each of be and bd, the strong primacy ef-
fect (with strict inequality) ensures this strict inequality regardless of the chosen decomposition.
Indeed, starting with bh, the tree is folded back using higher certainty equivalents sublottery by
sublottery, and evaluated using lower b’s, as compared to starting with the strictly higher bd. As
in Lemma 3, the history for any degenerate sublottery can be assigned ex-post according to what
is consistent; its value is not affected by the assignment of e or d.
Here we study the possibility of a third assignment of neutrality (n) for the case of equality in
value. For simplicity the characterization of bhn is given for h=0; the generalization is immediate.
Lemma 4. Suppose there is a nondegenerate r that is neutral in P=ha1;r;:::;a j;dxj;:::am;dxmi
in L 2. For any r0, deﬁne P(r0) = ha1;r0;:::;a j;dxj;:::am;dxmi. There is an open neighborhood
Nr of r such that if there is (1) nondegenerate r0 2 Nr strictly elating in P(r0), then be  bn; and
(2) nondegenerate r00 2 Nr disappointing in P(r00), then bn  bd. Moreover, at least one of (1) or
(2) holds.
Proof. If bn = be or bn = bd we are done. Suppose that for some nondegenerate r,
P = hp1;r;p2;dx;p3;dyi  hp1;dCEn(r);p2;dx;p3;dyi;
whereCEn(r) = u 1(V(r;u;bn)). Let g = minh2fe;dgjCEh(r) CEn(r)j (6= 0 if bn 6= bd and bn 6=





Supposeﬁrstthatre >1 r. Thenitcannotbethathp1;re;p2;dx;p3;dyihp1;dCEn(r);p2;dx;p3;dyi:
To see this, ﬁrst note that the RHS is indifferent to h1;dCEn(r)i. If re is neutral then the LHS is
indifferent to h1;dCEn(re)i, but indifference then contradicts monotonicity and CEn(re) >CEn(r).
So by construction we know thatCEn(r) 62 fCEe(re);CEn(re);CEd(re)g.
29Suppose that re is a strict elation. We claimCEe(re) >CEn(r). Suppose otherwise. We know
hp1;dCEn(r);p2;dx;p3;dyi  dCEn(r)  dCEe(re)  hp1;dCEe(re);p2;dx;p3;dyi:
But if the prize CEe(re) is elating in the single-stage lottery, and it is improved to CEn(r), then
as shown in Lemma 2, it must remain elating, a contradiction to being neutral. The same argu-
ment says that if re is a disappointment then CEd(re) < CEn(r). Given the choice of re in the
g-neighborhood above, this implies the desired conclusion.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of necessity is analogous to that of Theorem 1. The proof of sufﬁciency is analogous
to that of Theorem 2, with two additions of note. First, since overreaction to news and the strong
primacy effect (with strict inequalities) imply the value of each stochastic decision tree in a choice
set increases when evaluated as an elation, the value of the choice set (the maximum of those
values) also increases when viewed as an elation (relative to being viewed as a disappointment).
Second, if the value of a choice set is the same when viewed as an elation and as a disappointment,
the best option in both choice sets must be a degenerate continuation. Then its history assignment
may be made ex-post according to internal consistency.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 4
In proving sufﬁciency, we weaken the assumption in DA that u under each history is the same and









(1+b)u0(y)(1 a) x > y
(1+b)u0(x)a
u0(y)(1 a) x < y






Step 1: Evident elation or disappointment. For any a 2 (0;1), deﬁne the sets
Ld;a := fha;db;1 a;pi j p 2 L 1g;
Le;a := fha;dw;1 a;pi j p 2 L 1g; and
L0 := fh1;pi j p 2 L 1g
30which consist of all the lotteries of the form in Figure 5 in the main text. Without loss of generality,
consider the restriction of  to Le;a.” This induces e;a. The case of  restricted to Ld;a is
analogous.
Note that by Axiom CE and the deﬁnition ofCEe;(), for any p and a 2 (0;1),
ha;dw;1 a;pi  ha;dw;1 a;dCEe;(p)i: (4)
LetVe;a : Le;a ! R be a utility representation of  restricted to Le;a. Deﬁne




a j = 1; and x1;:::;xm 2 X g:
By (4),
Ve;a(Le;a) =Ve;a(Le;a \G);
ortherangeofVe;a isthesameonLe;a andonLe;a\G. LetV0 :L0 !Rbeautilityrepresentation
of  restricted to L0, which has a disappointment aversion representation by Axiom DA. By
uniqueness ofV0 up to increasing transformation, assume thatV0 itself is a disappointment aversion
representation. Deﬁne V : L 1 ! R by V(p) =V0(h1;pi). By Axiom TN, this represents lotteries
in G. By uniqueness of Ve;a up to increasing transformation, pick a transformation such that for
any x 2 X,
Ve;a(ha;dw;1 a;dxi) =V(ha;dw;1 a;dxi): (5)
Call u0 and b0 the Bernoulli utility and disappointment coefﬁcient corresponding toV0 (and there-





Because it is the only part on the RHS of (6) depending on p,  restricted to Le;a is identical to 
restricted to Le;a0 for a 6= a0 2 (0;1), so we drop the subscript a from Ve;a.
Since Ve(ha;dw;1 a;i) represents the restriction of  to Le;a, by Axiom DA it is an in-
creasing transformation of a Gul form Ge() (which has Bernoulli utility ue() and disappointment
coefﬁcient be). Because it is the only part on the RHS of (6) depending on p, u0(CEe;()) itself
must be an increasing transformation f() of Ge() over L 1: that is,
u0(CEe;(p)) = f(Ge(p)) for all p: (7)
31By deﬁnition, y =CEe;(dy). Plugging p = dy into (7) means
u0(y) = u0(CEe;(dy)) = f(Ge(dy)) = f(ue(y)): (8)













1+b0, and because Ge represents  on Le;a,



















(By Gul monotonicity, all u0s are strictly positive functions). Constant relative MRS says this is
independent of x;y wherever it exists. For simplicity assume u is differentiable (otherwise use








e(y) is constant in x;y. Pick w < z
l < z
h < b.





0(x) is constant for x 2 (z
l ;b], or there exists k1 such that u0
e(x) =
k1u0
0(x) for all x 2 (z
l ;b]. Similarly, setting x = z
h, there exists k2 such that u0
e(y) = k2u0
0(y) for
all y 2 [w;z
h). Because z
l < z
h, the intersection is nonempty and k1 = k2 = k. Hence ue and u0
are afﬁne transformations of each other. Moreover, k > 0.
Now recall (8), which implies that f must be the inverse afﬁne transformation mapping ue
back to u0. But if ue is a linear transformation of u0, then for any b, the Gul value of a lottery p
using ue is a linear transformation of the corresponding Gul value of p using u0; and f undoes this
transformation. Denote by G0;e() the value of a Gul functional calculated using u0 and be. We
have G0;e(p) = f(Ge(p)). Therefore u(CEe;(p)) = G0;e(p), indicating that CEe;(p) is indeed
the certainty equivalent calculated according to u0 and be. A similar argument works for CEd;.
Since u0 is used after all histories we refer to it simply as u.
To summarize, in this step we established that all the lotteries in Le;a, Ld;a, and L0 are eval-
uated by folding back, using disappontment aversion functionals with the same u but potentially
different b’s.
Step 2: Endogenous neutrality, elation or disappointment. Consider any nondegenerate P =
ha1;p1; ;am;pmi. By Axiom CAT, for every j = 1;2;:::;m, pj is elating or disappointing in P.
32Beginning with j = 1, this implies that
P  P(1) = ha1;dCEa(1);(p1);a2;p2 ;am;pmi for some a(1) 2 fe;dg:
Now, notice by Axiom CAT that p2 is elating or disappointing in P(1). Hence
P  P(1)  P(2) = ha1;dCEa(1);(p1);a2;dCEa(2);(p2) ;am;pmi for some a(2) 2 fe;dg:
By repeatedly applying categorization in this manner,
P  P(1)  P(2)    P(m 1)  P(m) = ha1;dCEa(1);(p1);a2;dCEa(2);(p2) ;am;dCEa(m);(pm)i;
where each a(j) 2 fe;dg. Moreover, by Axiom CAT and use of transitivity, if a(j) = e then
dCEe;(pj)  P(m), and if a(j) = d then P(m)  dCEd;(pj).13
13Notice that the construction of P(m) may have been path-dependent (potentially more than one of the relations
holds). But since P(m) is evaluated using a disappointment aversion representation (by Axioms TN and DA), for any
path of construction, either (i) P(m) has at least one CEd; and one CEe; or (ii) P(m) consists entirely of CEe;’s, all
of which are indifferent to P(m).
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